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Abstract. The financial crisis has triggered a new consensus among 
economists that it is necessary to include a banking sector in macroeconomic 
models. It is also necessary for the finance and banking literature to consider 
how best to incorporate systemic, macroeconomic feedbacks into its modeling 
of financial intermediation. Thus a new research programme on the link 
between banking and the economy is needed. This special issue is devoted to 
this theme. In this paper an overview of the issues and problems in the 
economics and finance literature is presented, and a concrete, simple approach 
is identified of how to incorporate banks into a macroeconomic model that 
solves many of these issues. The model distinguishes between the type of 
credit that boosts GDP and credit that is associated with asset prices and 
banking crises. The model is consistent with the empirical record. Some 
applications are discussed, namely the prediction and prevention of banking 
crises, implications for fiscal policy, and a solution to the European sovereign 
debt crisis that stimulates growth while avoiding the corner solutions of euro 
exit or fiscal union.  
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1   Introduction 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis emanating from the US and UK in 2007 
and 2008, macroeconomics has been the target of severe criticism.2 Thanks to the 
banking crisis, a broader spectrum of the public became aware of the fact that leading 
economic theories and models, as well as influential advanced textbooks in 
macroeconomics and monetary economics, did not feature money (e.g. Woodford, 
2003), or banks (Walsh, 2003; Woodford, 2003). In the UK in 2010, the most 
commonly used textbook in macroeconomics on MSc Economics programmes was 
that of Romer (2006), Advanced Macroeconomics.3 On page 3, Romer explains that 
he is not covering money in his book, because:  
 
“Incorporating money in models of growth would only obscure the analysis” (p. 3). 
 
Without money there is also no financial sector. Likewise, the hitherto popular 
DSGE models had not included a financial sector, a deficiency not easily remedied 
due to their particular methodology and assumptions. Economists have increasingly 
conceded that this state of affairs is unsatisfactory. Alan Greenspan confessed in 2008 
that he recognised a ‘flaw’ in mainstream models (Congress, 2010). Simon Johnson 
(2009) of the Peterson Institute of International Economics concluded:  
 
“Whether or not our economies manage to avoid a major global depression, economics is in 
crisis. … [We need] to rethink a great deal about economics and how economies operate” 
(Johnson, 2009). 
 
Donald Kohn (2009), as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, reflected the sense 
of embarrassment of the economics profession when having to admit to the public that 
our economic models simply assumed that banks did not exist:  
 
“It is fair to say …that the core macroeconomic modelling framework used at the Federal 
Reserve and other central banks around the world has included, at best, only a limited role 
for …credit provision, and financial intermediation.  …asset price movements and the 
feedback among those movements, credit supply, and economic activity were not well 
captured by the models used at most central banks.“ 
 
These insights did not arrive a moment too early. Macroeconomics has experienced 
a number of major empirical challenges over the past thirty years or so, which have 
                                                          
2 For instance, Nassim Taleb said: “People who were driving a school bus blindfolded (and crashed it) 
should never be given a new bus. The economics establishment (universities, regulators, central bankers, 
government officials, various organisations staffed with economists) lost its legitimacy with the failure 
of the system. It is irresponsible and foolish to put our trust in the ability of such experts to get us out of 
this mess. Instead, find the smart people whose hands are clean.” (Taleb, 2009). 
3 Survey of top 40 MSc programmes conducted by author in September 2010. 
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largely remained unaddressed by the mainstream literature. The time may now be ripe 
for a more fundamental rethink in order to address them. 
While economists seem to have taken the brunt of the public critique triggered by 
the crisis, researchers in the fields of banking and finance, often situated at business 
schools and supposedly more keenly interested in real world applications of their 
work, seem to have largely avoided criticism. However it could be argued that 
banking and finance research also failed in delivering prescriptions, tools and 
recommendations for appropriate regulation, supervision and risk management. While 
economists had dropped banking from their work, entire disciplines exist that focus 
almost exclusively on financial intermediaries. Why did they not warn about the 
looming banking crisis? Alan Greenspan said in 2008 that “modern portfolio 
management… the entire edifice… has collapsed” (Congress, 2010). Why did the 
apparently sophisticated approaches in risk management, portfolio optimisation and 
asset allocation seem of little help when the banking crisis struck? 
A fundamental problem seems to be the very separation of disciplines into 
economics on the one hand, with the potential to capture systemic and 
macroeconomic aspects, and finance and banking on the other, with the potential to 
model banks in detail. The separation allowed the systemic importance of banks to 
remain unnoticed: The economists have tended not to model the financial 
infrastructure and banking, and the finance and banking researchers have tended not 
to be concerned with macroeconomic effects of the collective behaviour of financial 
intermediaries. Focusing on microeconomic studies of representative financial 
institutions, they neglected the systemic effects of collective bank behaviour that may 
affect the entire economy and thus generate important feedback to financial 
intermediaries. Both disciplines had developed in a way that blindsided them 
concerning banking crises. 
It could thus be said that economics needs more finance and banking, while finance 
and banking need more economics. A new interdisciplinary research programme on 
‘Banking and the Economy’ is required, based on the inductive, empirically-based 
research methodology. This special issue is devoted to a first conference on this 
theme, the European Conference on Banking and the Economy (ECOBATE), held on 
29 September 2011 at Winchester Guildhall, and organised by the Centre for Banking, 
Finance and Sustainable Development, University of Southampton Management 
School. This paper is meant as a call for such a new interdisciplinary research 
programme on banking and the economy. To illustrate the need and importance of 
this topic, I survey the state of modern macroeconomics, combined with commentary 
on relevant finance theory, and point out the many empirical challenges that need to 
be overcome. But to take the discussion a step further, I present an introduction to a 
concrete model linking banking and the economy via the reflection of a fundamental, 
yet usually neglected fact about banks of which both finance and economics experts 
are often unaware for the majority of their career: banks create the money supply 
through the process of ‘credit creation’. This topic is also the focus of the keynote 
address of the ECOBATE conference, by Lord Adair Turner (2011), FSA Chairman. 
This special issue carries selected contributions to the conference. As there is also a 
need for a forum to discuss policy-focused papers, a selection of such contributions, 
including Lord Turner’s, can be found in a special policy section.  
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In this paper I first discuss seven major empirical puzzles in macroeconomics and 
then a simple modification of the most basic macro model, the quantity equation. The 
latter enables the introduction of the banking sector into macroeconomic models and 
offers solutions to the puzzles. I next discuss the justification for this model and its 
empirical record. This is followed by an application of the model to current questions 
of how to prevent banking crises, how fiscal policy can be effective or ineffective 
depending on the role and contribution of the banking sector, and how to solve the 
European sovereign debt crisis.  
2 Major ‘Anomalies’ in Macroeconomics 
2.1 The Velocity Decline and the Inability to Define Money  
The widespread criticism of recent macroeconomic approaches suggests that the 
research agenda culminating in models that neither feature banks nor incorporate 
monetary variables has not been successful. If macroeconomics has proceeded down 
the wrong path, one needs to return to the crossroads at which the path to moneyless 
real business cycle models, DSGE formulations or versions of Woodford’s (2003) 
approach was taken.  
It may not be possible to identify a single point in time, but the late 1980s cannot 
be far off: Until about the mid-1980s, the hitherto prevailing approaches (classical, 
many neo-classical, Keynesian, monetarist and post-Keynesian approaches, as well as 
most eclectic models), despite their differences, had much in common. They still 
included a monetary aggregate that was linked to nominal GDP through the quantity 
equation:  
 
(1) M V = P Y 
 
whereby M stands for the money supply (measured and defined variously as M0, 
M1, M2, M3 or M4), V denotes the (income) velocity of money (originally the 
number of times gold was said to circulate during an observation period), P the GDP 
deflator (the appropriate price level) and Y symbolises real GDP. PY hence represents 
nominal GDP. Expressed in logarithms, this relationship can also be stated as: 
 
(2) m + v = p + y  
 
Friedman had famously claimed that this equation was characterized by a  
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“uniformity… of the same order as many of the uniformities that form the basis of the 
physical sciences. And the uniformity is in more than direction. There is an extraordinary 
empirical stability and regularity to such magnitudes as income velocity that cannot but 
impress anyone who works extensively with monetary data” (Friedman, 1956, p. 21).  
 
He still called it “an identity, a truism” decades later (Friedman, 1992, p. 39). 
Handa (2000) still wrote, somewhat confidently, that equation (1) 
 
“is valid under any set of circumstances whatever since it can be reduced to the statement: 
in a given period by a given group of people, expenditures equal expenditures, with only a 
difference in the computational method between them” (p. 25).  
 
Until about the mid-1980s equations (1) or (2) were the widely accepted work-
horse that represented the link between the tangible (‘real’) economy and the 
financial/monetary sectors. However, from the early 1980s onwards, faith in this link 
had been increasingly shaken by the widespread and growing empirical observation 
that velocity had become erratic, was declining significantly and the money demand 
function was unstable (e.g. Hendry, 1985; Belongia and Chalfant, 1990; Boughton, 
1991). The ‘quantity equation’ relationship, expressed as a stable income velocity, 
“came apart at the seams during the course of the 1980s” (Goodhart, 1989). This 
phenomenon is known as the ‘velocity decline’, ‘breakdown of the money demand 
function’, or even the ‘mystery of the missing money’ (Goldfeld et al., 1976). It has 
been described as a world-wide “puzzling” anomaly (Belongia and Chalfant, 1990). 
Once “viewed as a pillar of macroeconomic models”, the quantity equation “is now 
… one of the weakest stones in the foundation” (Boughton, 1991). As a result, 
economists could not identify a reliable relationship between a monetary aggregate 
and nominal GDP.  
The implications of the observed velocity decline and breakdown in the money 
demand function for macroeconomics were devastating. This empirical failure not 
only discredited monetarism, but posed a major obstacle to all the other schools of 
thought as well, most of which had previously relied on the quantity equation in one 
way or another.  
Attempts at explaining this phenomenon raised more questions than they answered: 
usually attributed to financial deregulation and innovations (e.g. Judd and Scadding, 
1981; Gordon, 1984; Hetzel, 1984; Roley, 1985; Miller, 1986), it was argued that this 
lowered velocity (as money was used more efficiently). But the empirical record of 
financial deregulation was to increase the volume of transactions, suggesting a higher 
speed of transactions. After an initial burst of papers attempting to explain this puzzle, 
the discipline turned away from it – not because the problem had been solved: the 
apparent anomaly grew bigger over time, and no convincing explanations had been 
provided. 
 
As one monetary aggregate after another succumbed to an unstable relationship 
with nominal GDP, the profession became ever less specific about the very definition 
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of money. Today, textbooks, as well as leading central bank publications, state that 
they do not know just what money is. In the words of then Federal Reserve staff: 
 
“…there is still no definitive answer in terms of all its final uses to the question: What is 
money?” (Belongia and Chalfant, 1990, p. 32).  
 
Miller and Van Hoose (1993) concluded their chapter on money:  
 
“Although there is widespread agreement among economists that money is important, they 
have never agreed on how to define and how to measure money” (p. 42). 
 
The empirical failure to define money without much ambiguity has been one of the 
weaknesses of the macroeconomics prevalent until about the mid-1980s, and it is one 
that remains unresolved within the mainstream. 
Motivated by the velocity decline and the inability to define money clearly, in the 
1980s leading economists called for the adoption of “an alternative paradigm” 
(Spindt, 1987; Judd and Scadding, 1982; Gordon, 1984; Roley, 1985). We know that 
this was the time at which the paradigm of moneyless economic models, real business 
cycle theories and supply-side economics became influential. Given that the 
profession had a fundamental problem with handling money, such moneyless models 
must have become more appealing to economists. If nothing else, they seemed to 
offer an escape route from an apparently intractable problem. However, adopting non-
monetary models because previous attempts at modeling money had not been 
successful is not an acceptable scientific research methodology. The currently 
prevailing paradigm therefore must face the criticism that it was potentially adopted 
as a form of escapism. Instead of rising to the challenges posed by the velocity 
decline and getting to the root of the problem, economists simply assumed away the 
problem, by operating on the empirically unsupported premise that money (and 
banks) did not matter. 
This development also began to drive a wedge between the research agendas of 
monetary and macroeconomists on the one hand, and banking and finance researchers 
on the other. It turned out to be a costly separation, as especially the systemic 
(macroeconomic) implications of collective bank actions seemed to fall between two 
stools.  
However, there were other challenges which indicated already many years ago that 
not all was well. If adopting non-monetary models was meant to sidestep the 
empirical failure of prior approaches, economists must have felt haunted when other 
empirical challenges arose that have proven equally devastating for the non-monetary 
models.  
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2.2 Banks and Banking Crises 
The role of banks has remained a persistent puzzle in conventional 
macroeconomics – whether of the pre- or post-1980s type. Because of the belief that 
they are mere financial intermediaries without any special features that would justify 
a unique representation, they have not been explicitly modelled in a meaningful way 
in major macroeconomic theories and models over the past thirty years. There is 
however a small though important body of evidence to the effect that banks are 
special in some way that standard theory cannot explain (e.g. Fama, 1985; Peek and 
Rosengren, 2000; Ashcraft, 2005; Werner, 1992; Werner, 2005; Leary, 2009; 
Voutsinas and Werner, 2011). Blanchard and Fischer (1989) pointed out already more 
than twenty years ago: 
 
“The notion that there is something about banks that makes them ‘special’ is a recurrent 
theme.” (p. 478). 
 
But since conventional approaches failed to identify the nature of this special 
feature, economists did not feel compelled to include banks in their modelling efforts. 
With banks unexplained, so has been the powerful phenomenon of the recurring 
banking crises, which time and again provide a stark reminder that banks indeed have 
an important role to play in the economy. Caprio and Klingebiehl (1999) have shown 
that there have been well over a hundred banking crises in the past fifty years and 
their number and magnitude seems to have increased during that time, not decreased. 
See also the more recent work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). The ‘anomaly’ of 
banking crises became the Achilles heel of the moneyless theories that had become 
dominant since the mid-1980s. 
2.3 The Empirical Puzzle of Interest Rates 
There are other significant ‘anomalies’ that have challenged the old as well as the 
new mainstream approaches. While theories place great store by the role of interest 
rates as the pivotal variable that has significant causal force, empirically they seem far 
less powerful in explaining business cycles or developments in the economy than 
theory would have it. 4  In empirical work, interest rate variables often lack 
explanatory power, significance or the ‘right’ sign.5 When a correlation between 
interest rates and economic growth is found, it is not more likely to be negative than 
positive. 6  Interest rates have also not been able to explain major asset price 
                                                          
4 See Melvin (1983) and Leeper and Gordon (1983), who found little support for the so-called 
liquidity effect of interest rates on the money supply. 
5 King and Levine (1993) did not find evidence to support the hypothesized relationship 
between real interest rate and economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Taylor (1999) 
found that the link between real interest rates and macroeconomic aggregates such as 
consumption and investment is tenuous.   
6 Kuttner and Mosser (2002) pointed out the positive correlation between GDP growth and 
interest rates in the US between 1950 and 2000. Dotsey, Lantz and Scholl (2003) examined the 
 8
movements (on Japanese land prices, see Asako, 1991; on Japanese stock prices, see 
French and Poterba, 1991; on the US real estate market see Dokko et al., 1990), nor 
capital flows (Ueda, 1990; Werner, 1994) – phenomena that in theory should be 
explicable largely through the price of money (interest rates). Furthermore, in terms 
of timing, interest rates appear as likely to follow economic activity as to lead it.7  
This became apparent when the Japanese central bank lowered interest rates over a 
dozen times in the 1990s, while the economy continued to stagnate and the money 
supply failed to expand. But Keynesian, post-Keynesian and even most monetarist 
advice was based on a monetary transmission mechanism via interest rates.  
Again, there were many attempts at explaining this phenomenon, producing the 
voluminous ‘credit view’ literature (including the ‘bank lending view’ and the 
‘balance sheet channel’ approach; see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). These attempts 
also failed: They could not resolve the empirical puzzle, because according to its 
proponents the additional credit channel of monetary transmission should enhance the 
role of interest rates. This was evidently not the case in Japan or a number of other 
major economies. As a result, key proponents began to distance themselves from this 
approach (Bernanke, 1993; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
An attempt was made to explain the apparent failure of falling interest rates to 
stimulate the economy by reviving the ‘liquidity trap’ argument, originating in 
Keynesian approaches, and subsequently adopted by rational expectations theories 
(Krugman, 1998). While there is a widespread perception that the ‘liquidity trap’ 
explanation has been successful, in fact it failed to even ask the right question, let 
alone offer an answer to it: The liquidity trap argument is about a situation where 
interest rates have fallen to their lowest point, and it merely argues that, at this point, 
interest rate-based monetary policy cannot be effective (since rates cannot be reduced 
further). However, in Japan interest rates reached their lowest point only in March 
2003, after over a decade of recession and over a dozen interest rate reductions. As to 
the relevant question at hand, namely why repeated interest rate reductions over a 
decade have failed to stimulate the economy, the liquidity trap argument has nothing 
to say.8 As it turns out, the liquidity trap argument is merely the restatement of the 
tautology that rates cannot fall further when they have fallen to the lowest possible 
point.  
                                                                                                                                           
behaviour of real interest rates. Their results disclosed the real interest rate series is 
contemporaneously positively correlated with lagged cyclical output. Other studies finding a 
positive correlation between interest rates and growth include Gelb (1989), Polak (1989), 
Easterly (1990) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992). This positive relationship between 
interest rates and growth is also acknowledged in a leading textbook in advanced 
macroeconomics (Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). For a comparative empirical study on 
the US, UK, Germany and Japan, see Werner and Zhu (2011). 
7 While Stock and Watson (1999) find that the nominal rate is a leading business-cycle 
indicator, short-term interest rates, since influenced by central banks, tend to follow nominal 
GDP growth. The same also seems to apply to long-term interest rates (Werner, 2005). 
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) showed that long term interest rates react to various 
macroeconomic shocks that in the conventional macroeconomic models are only expected to 
affect short-term interest rates.  
8 For a survey of how the literature has dealt with the ineffectiveness of interest rate policy in 
Japan, see Werner (2006). 
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For interest rates to play the role theory suggests, the money and credit markets 
have to be in equilibrium. But Japan’s recession, about to enter its third decade, 
makes sport even of the contention that in the medium to long run markets are in 
equilibrium. Many economists have been trained to avoid contemplating the 
possibility that markets may never be in equilibrium. Yet, this is a distinct possibility. 
In such a world, it would not be prices (such as interest rates) that determine 
outcomes, but quantities (such as the quantity of credit). Further, rationing implies 
that an allocation decision is made that can be decided on the basis of non-price or 
even non-market factors, such as the extraction of ‘rents’ or benefits (Werner, 2005). 
Even Blanchard and Fischer (1989) noted, in a comment that echoes their sentiment 
on the missing role of banks: 
 
“A recurrent theme in the literature and among market participants is that the interest alone 
does not adequately reflect the links between financial markets and the rest of the economy. 
Rather, it is argued, the availability of credit and the quality of balance sheets are important 
determinants of the rate of investment” (p. 478). 
 
This has stirred interest in the credit rationing argument (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). However, even this eminently sensible explanation raised 
more questions than it answered: the credit rationing argument itself does not explain 
why available alternatives to domestic bank credit (foreign bank credit, direct finance, 
equity issuance) failed to compensate for credit supply constraints. In effect, credit 
rationing is a microeconomic argument without any explicit macroeconomic 
implications. However, it is macroeconomic issues that require explanation: why have 
interest rate reductions failed to stimulate the economy, and why could non-bank 
sources of funding not compensate for lack of bank credit?   
2.4 The Failure of Supply-Side Explanations 
Some economists consider ineffective demand management policies – such as in 
Japan’s case – as evidence that supply-side economic reforms should be adopted 
instead. However, the supply-side advice to increase productivity and factor input 
mobilization through deregulation, liberalization and privatization, derived from new 
classical theories, has hardly fared any better than the conventional demand side 
economics: there is no evidence that the significant textbook supply-side structural 
reforms that Japan undertook in the past 30 years has helped in the short-term or the 
long-term, or that structural factors were actually the cause of the recession (see 
Werner, 2004). This adds to the older empirical challenge that the phenomenal 
economic performance of Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Germany (mid-1930s to early 
1970s) and China (since 1982) has posed to mainstream approaches. The latter argued 
that only economies with freer markets should be efficient and productive, while 
economies using non-market mechanisms and government intervention should be less 
so. As Chalmers Johnson (1999) argued: 
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“Japan’s ‘flagrantly flouting all received principles of capitalist rationality’, to use 
Dore’s words (1986, p. 18), was turning it into one of the world’s richest big nations 
and the model for all the other countries of East Asia, including China” (p. 33). 
 
Proponents were reduced to arguing, somewhat improbably, that Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, and China, as well as Germany earlier on, were successful despite their non-
market mechanisms and government intervention in the form of incentive-compatible 
institutional design and allocation of credit, not because of it. The implication of this 
argument is that these countries would have been even more successful, had they not 
engaged in such policies (see Johnson, 1988, for an eloquent rebuttal). 
Thomas Kuhn (1962) argued in his account of the growth of scientific knowledge 
that researchers operate within generally accepted ‘paradigms’. The process of 
shifting to a new, more advanced paradigm is not necessarily smooth, as the old 
paradigm is supported by those who have made a career out of its propagation. 
Lakatos (1970) argued that defenders of the ‘old paradigm’ (defined by him as a 
research programme) would adopt ‘immunisation’ strategies, such as the introduction 
of ad hoc assumptions, to try to ‘protect’ their ‘core’ beliefs against contrary 
empirical evidence – a practice already condemned by Karl Popper (1968) as 
unscientific. As the number of inexplicable facts rises (‘anomalies’, in Kuhn’s 
terminology), the call for a new paradigm should become louder. The new paradigm 
must be able to explain at least as much as the previous approach and in addition also 
account for the many ‘anomalies’ of the old paradigm, thereby encompassing it. 
If the analysis of Kuhn and Lakatos applies to macroeconomics, then defenders of 
the conventional approaches should have become increasingly embattled over the past 
thirty years, and ever more reliant on inconsistent ad hoc assumptions, while criticism 
of their approaches spread. 
Proponents of real business cycle theories have indeed argued that 
macroeconomics should respond to the challenges posed by the financial crisis by 
incorporating a financial or banking sector into DSGE models. This is recognizable as 
an ad hoc modification of an incompatible approach. Instead, a new paradigm is 
needed. Already before the crisis a number of influential economists, including 
Joseph Stiglitz and collaborators had renewed the call for a “new paradigm”.
9
 The 
slow but steady rise of non-mainstream theories over the past twenty years, including 
institutional economics, experimental economics, psychological economics, 
behavioural economics and economic history – all sub-disciplines with an empirical 
orientation – suggests that momentum is building in favour of a shift towards a model 
developed from an inductive research methodology.  
I believe that a convincing new paradigm can only arise from an inductive 
approach, avoiding the errors of the prevailing paradigm, which was built on the 
hypothetico-deductive method that starts with so-called first principles by adding 
unrealistic assumptions to erroneous axioms. A new paradigm must rise to the 
challenge of explaining at least the seven central empirical puzzles in macro- and 
monetary economics: 
                                                          
9 See Stiglitz (2001), Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003). 
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(1) The apparent velocity decline; (2) the identification problem of money, and (3) 
of what makes banks special (while incorporating this feature appropriately into a 
macroeconomic model); (4) why there are recurring banking crises; (5) the 
ineffectiveness of over a decade of interest rate reductions in stimulating growth in 
Japan (and a growing number of other countries), and, more generally, the link 
between interest rates and growth; (6) the success of the German and East Asian 
economic model, despite wide-spread government intervention and use of non-market 
mechanisms; and (7) the ineffectiveness of supply-side reforms (deregulation, 
liberalization, privatization) in enhancing economic performance in Japan and other 
countries. 
In the following section it will be argued that – following the inductive method – 
empirical observation of key aspects of banking activity can be used to construct such 
an alternative approach by modifying the last common macro model that included 
money: the quantity equation. In response to the empirical failures of equations (1) or 
(2) economists in the late 1980s could have persisted in identifying the reasons for its 
failure and formulated an alternative framework, instead of abandoning it. In fact I 
first proposed such a modification in its basic form in 1991 (Werner, 1992), but 
economists had already embarked on their moneyless research paradigm, while 
finance researchers showed little interest in systemic issues. The model has however 
stood the test of time well. I would argue that the past twenty years have further 
strengthened its appeal.  
3  Two Flaws in the Quantity Equation and How to Address Them 
3.1 The Role of Financial Transactions 
There are two flaws in the use of the most widely accepted version of the quantity 
equation (equations 1 or 2). As a result, it is neither “valid under any set of 
circumstances whatever” (as Handa, 2000, still claimed), nor “an identiy, a truism” 
(Friedman, 1990). To the contrary, it is a special case that applies only under 
exceptional circumstances. More often than not it is incorrect, resulting in the 
apparent ‘velocity decline’.   
The first flaw emerges when reconsidering the original formulation by Irving 
Fisher (1911), based on Newcomb (1885) and John Stuart Mill (1848), which can be 
stated as follows: 
(3)   M V = P Q 
Fisher said that the ‘effective’ money MV (assumed to circulate and be used for 
transactions) is equal to the value of transactions (the sum of all pairs of prices times 
 12
quantities transacted).10 We can rephrase this slightly and say that, in its original 
form, the quantity equation stated: 
 
The total value of transactions during any time period must be the same as the amount of 
money used to pay for these transactions. 
 
This is now an equation that indeed is “valid under any set of circumstances 
whatever” and is of course the reason why the quantity equation is also known as the 
‘equation of exchange’.11 But there was an important drawback to Fisher’s equation. 
When attempting to apply it in practice by using data, M and P could be readily 
identified. V is hard to measure and thus had to be the residual. Thus data on 
transactions Q were necessary. But they did not exist, at least not in official 
publications (today central banks could easily publish such figures – available to them 
in real time due to their function as clearing house of all bank transactions, which in 
turn account for a likely 97% of all transaction values in the economy – but they have 
chosen not to do so). As national income accounts were becoming increasingly 
available, Pigou (1917) and several of his colleagues at Cambridge University argued 
that the stock of money should be proportional to ‘total nominal expenditures’, which 
could be represented by the expenditure-side of GNP. Many Cambridge economists 
therefore replaced PQ with PY, yielding the most widely-known formulation of the 
quantity equation in (1) above.12 
This change in the definition of the quantity equation is usually undertaken with 
minimal justification. Milton Friedman, for instance, explains that  
 
“Fisher, in his original version, used T to refer to all transactions – purchases of final 
goods and services…, intermediate transactions…, and capital transactions (the purchase of 
a house or a share of stock). In current usage, the item has come to be interpreted as 
referring to purchases of final goods and services only, and the notation has been changed 
accordingly, T being replaced by y, as corresponding to real income” (Friedman, 1990, p. 
38).  
 
While it is undoubtedly true that it “has come to be interpreted as referring to 
purchases of final goods and services only”, which can be represented by GDP, 
Friedman fails to tell us why this is justified and what the implicit assumptions are. 
From a comparison with Fisher’s earlier formulation we know that equation (1) is a 
special case that is only accurate if: 
                                                          
10 Fisher originally used the notation MV=PT, whereby T stands for the quantity of transactions. 
11 Since Fisher had the concept of species in mind as money M, and since he realized that the total volume 
of transactions was much larger than the stock of gold or precious metals, he, like other economists at the 
time, felt that banking or other financial innovations served to economise on this stock of gold. Thus 
some kind of ‘multiplier’ was necessary – the number of times one unit of gold money M was used for 
transactions during the period of observation. This is velocity V. 
12 Only marginally different by solving for M, thus representing it as a money demand function, with 1/V 
on the r.h.s. renamed ‘k’ – the ‘Marshallian k’, named in honour of another Cambridge economist. 
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(4) P Y = P Q 
 
or, in other words, if nominal GDP is a robust proxy for the value of total 
transactions in the economy for which money is changing hands. When considering 
growth rates, the lesser requirement applies that transactions proxied by GDP are a 
constant proportion of total transactions. However, it is neither clear that GDP 
accurately reflects all transactions in the economy nor that GDP-based transactions 
are a constant proportion of total transactions. Friedman (1990, p. 38), casually inserts 
the formulation “if we restrict purchases to final goods and services…” in his 
explanation of equation (1). But as Friedman acknowledges, Fisher originally 
included asset transactions. These constitute an important potential use of money M. 
They may be of substantial volume in modern economies – often a multiple of GDP – 
yet are not included in the GDP statistics, as the latter reflect income, value added in 
production and services or expenditure on goods and services only. Capital gains on 
assets are not included in the income definition. Financial sector transactions affect 
wealth, but are not part of income and hence GDP (for more details on national 
income accounting, see UN 1993, 2003, or Lequiller, 2004). Likewise, the majority of 
real estate transactions are not part of the GDP statistics. 
John Stuart Mill (1848) suggested that one must consider the possibility that 
money is used not for goods (and services), but instead for financial transactions, such 
as the purchase of securities.13 Jeremy Bentham did so as well, and in fact came to 
different, probably more accurate, conclusions than Mill - but the publication of his 
key contribution to this topic was delayed by well over a century and remains little 
known (see Bentham, 1952-54). 14  Fisher, and after him Keynes, suggested to 
distinguish between transactions arising from the sale or purchase of finished goods 
and services (which can be measured by GDP) and financial transactions that are not 
related to national income. 15  Theoretical and empirical work using a similar 
distinction includes Selden (1956), Spindt (1985), Cramer (1986), Stone and Thornton 
(1987), Niggle (1988) and Allen (1989). The UK’s Central Statistical Office (1986) 
argued that the total value of transactions should be used in the quantity equation, 
while GDP was merely a subset of transactions involving final output.
16
 It can 
therefore be said that the need to distinguish between GDP-based transactions and 
non-GDP-based transactions has been pointed out clearly in the literature, although 
this was not successfully linked to a corresponding separation of relevant monetary 
aggregates.
17
 Yet, the mainstream use of the quantity equation has remained confined 
                                                          
13 It frequently happens that money, to a considerable amount, is brought into the country, is there actually 
invested as capital, and again flows out, without having ever once acted upon the markets of 
commodities, but only upon the market of securities, or, as it is commonly though improperly called, the 
money market” (Book III, chapter 8, para. 18). 
14 Thanks to Gunnar Tomason for pointing this out. 
15  Fisher (1926) distinguished between income and financial transactions, Keynes (1930) between 
‘industrial’ and ‘financial’ transactions. 
16 As quoted by Howells and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1992). 
17 See also Werner (1992, 1997d) for an overview and a counter-example presented below. 
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to nominal income, neglecting the possibility that money is used for non-GDP 
transactions.  
Thus equation (1) will not be reliable when the value of non-GDP transactions, 
such as asset transactions, rises. In those time periods we must expect the traditional 
quantity equation, MV=PY, to give the appearance of a fall in the velocity V, as 
money is increasingly used for transactions other than nominal GDP (PY). This 
explains why in many countries with asset price booms economists puzzled over an 
apparent ‘velocity decline’, ‘breakdown of the money demand function’ or a ‘mystery 
of missing money’.18  
 
The solution is to disaggregate the general equation of exchange for all transactions 
into two flows – those of money used for GDP (‘real’, hence subscript R) and those of 
money used for non-GDP transactions (‘financial’, subscript F). As Friedman pointed 
out about equation (3):  
 
 
“Each side of this equation can be broken into subcategories: the right-hand side into 
different categories of transactions and the left-hand side into payments in different form” 
(Friedman, ‘Quantity Theory’, Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th edition, p. 435).  
 
 
This was first successfully implemented by Werner (1992, 1997). Following this 
framework, we choose to disaggregate both sides of (1), on the one hand into money 
used for transactions that are part of GDP (called MRVR) and those that are not (called 
MFVF), and on the other hand the value of transactions that are part of GDP (PRQR) 
which should be accurately proxied by nominal GDP (PRY), and those that are not 
(PFQF):
19
 
 
(5)  MV =  MRVR  +  MFVF 
 
(6)  PQ = PRQR   + PFQF 
 
At the same time, equations (7) and (8) must also hold: 
 
(7) MRVR  = PRQR   
 
(8) MFVF  = PFQF 
 
Since we defined PRQR as the value of all transactions contributing to GDP, the 
value of transactions that are part of GDP should be equal to nominal GDP (PRY): 
 
(7’)  MRVR  = PRY 
 
  with VR = (PRY)/MR = const.  
                                                          
18 Spindt (1985), Howells and Biefang-Fisancho Mariscal (1992) and Werner (1992, 1997). 
19 As has been suggested by Werner (1992, 1994b, 1994c, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 
1996d, 1996e, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 1997e, 2002b, 2003c). See also Economics Focus, The 
Economist, 19 June 1993, p. 74 
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With a stable ‘real’ velocity of money, VR, the effective amount of money used for 
GDP transactions during any period of time (MRVR) must be equal to nominal GDP. 
Meanwhile, the amount of money effectively used for non-GDP transactions will be 
equal to the value of these non-GDP transactions.  
 
By definition, for economic growth to take place, the value of economic 
transactions during one time period must exceed that of the previous period of 
comparison. Considering therefore net changes in variables over the observed time 
period, we obtain: 
 
(9) ∆(MRVR)  =  ∆(PRY) 
 
(10) ∆(MFVF)  =  ∆(PFQF) 
 
We can say that the rise (fall) in the amount of money used for GDP-based 
transactions is equal to the rise (fall) in nominal GDP. Similarly equation (10) states 
that the rise (fall) in the amount of money used for non-GDP transactions is equal to 
the change in the value of non-GDP transactions. In other words, an asset bubble can 
be caused if more money is created and injected into asset markets.  
3.2 How to Measure Money Used for Transactions 
In order to put data into these equations we must now agree on how to measure 
money (or, to be precise, MV, the net amount of nominal money effectively used for 
all transactions). As we saw, the inability to define money has been a major anomaly. 
Fisher, Keynes and most post-war researchers used deposit aggregates ranging from 
M0 to M4 to represent M in the quantity equation. But there are a number of problems 
with this approach. 
 
Firstly, the original equation of exchange defines M as the purchasing power that is 
actually exerted when transactions take place. The so-called ‘money supply’ ‘M’-
aggregates, as traditionally defined, mainly consist of money deposited with banks or 
the central bank. They measure subsets of private-sector savings and hence money 
that, at the moment of measurement, is not used for transactions. The original 
equation of exchange however demands a measure of that money which is used for 
transactions – money in circulation, not money out of circulation. 
 
John Stuart Mill (1848) was clear on this point, but subsequent authors have tended 
to neglect it. First he defines the quantity equation as a transactions equation, as 
described later by Fisher and by us above.20 He then points out that  
                                                          
20 “The whole of the goods sold (counting each resale of the same goods as so much added to the goods) 
have been exchanged for the whole of the money, multiplied by the number of purchases made on the 
average by each piece. Consequently, the amount of goods and of transactions being the same, the value 
of money is inversely as its quantity multiplied by what is called the rapidity of circulation. And the 
quantity of money in circulation is equal to the money value of all the goods sold, divided by the number 
which expresses the rapidity of circulation” (Book III, Chapter 8, paragraph 13).  
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“Whatever may be the quantity of money in the country, only that part of it will affect prices 
which goes into the market of commodities, and is there actually exchanged against goods. 
Whatever increases the amount of this portion of the money in the country, tends to raise 
prices. But money hoarded does not act on prices. Money kept in reserve by individuals to 
meet contingencies which do not occur, does not act on prices. The money in the coffers of 
the Bank, or retained as a reserve by private bankers, does not act on prices until drawn 
out, nor even then unless drawn out to be expended in commodities” (Book III, Chapter 8, 
par. 17, p. 20). 
 
Secondly, defining money by certain private sector assets, such as deposits, creates 
the identification problem recognized by Friedman (1956) that “there is no hard-and-
fast line between ‘money’ and other assets” (p. 65). 
  
Thirdly, using the traditional definition of money as cash or deposits, it remains 
impossible to implement a disaggregation of the money by the use it is put to. As 
Friedman (1956) noted, “dollars of money are not distinguished according as they are 
said to be held for one or the other purpose” (p. 61). 
 
The correct definition of money for purposes of these equations is one that 
measures the money that actually circulates in the economy and is used for 
transactions at any moment in time, as Mill would have argued. It is an empirical 
question to find out what data conveys this information.  
 
The issue can be reformulated: equation (9) defines nominal GDP growth (PRY). 
Growth this year means that more transactions (that are part of GDP) have taken place 
this year than last year. We know that this is only possible if more money has also 
exchanged hands to pay for these transactions. The next question therefore is: how 
can the amount of money used for transactions increase in our modern financial 
system? If we had a pure gold standard – which is what most classical and many 
neoclassical theories were designed for – then the answer would be that either gold 
retired from circulation (savings) is spent and put into circulation, or more gold is 
discovered, extracted and injected into the economy. However, today no country is on 
a gold standard. Instead, we have a system of fiat money. There are many different 
ways of organising such a system and history is full of interesting case studies.  
 
At this juncture it is necessary to remind ourselves of the most successful (since 
efficient) research methodology, namely the one applied in the natural sciences: the 
inductive (or empirical) method. The deductive approach postulates to start with 
axioms and assumptions, on which theories are built which are then inevitably 
challenged by empirical reality. The alternative is to start with empirical facts, which 
are used to identify patterns and formulate theories, which then can be tested against 
the facts again. 
 
How is money created and injected in our present-day system? This is a simple 
question that empirical research should quickly be able to answer. Intriguingly, 
virtually no research is published on this question at all in the leading journals of 
macroeconomics, monetary economics, or banking and finance. To be sure, they carry 
many articles that make assumptions about how a theoretical monetary system may be 
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defined in the particular cases of their stylised models. This does not help us further 
though, if we are interested in reality. 
 
The particular type of fiat money system that is currently employed world-wide is 
one in which about 97% of the money supply is created and allocated by private 
profit-oriented enterprises, namely the banks. How do banks create money? As 
Werner (1992, 1997, 2005) argued and as we show in Ryan-Collins et al. (2011), 
banks simply invent 97% of the money supply when they credit borrowers’ bank 
accounts with sums of money that nobody transferred into these accounts from other 
parts of the economy. To use another phrase: banks create money out of nothing when 
they extend bank credit (or purchase other assets, or pay their staff). This is why the 
process of granting bank loans is better described by the expression credit creation.  
 
It is a simple point. So much so that J. K. Galbraith (1975) said of it: 
 
“The process by which banks create money is so simple that the mind is repelled. When 
something so important is involved, a deeper mystery seems only decent” (p. 18f). 
 
 On the one hand the fact that banks create the money supply is well known to a 
small group of experts. This is attested by many central bank publications, although 
mostly in obscure locations that have not attracted attention.21 It has also been 
recognized by Pollexfen (1697), Law (1720), Thornton (1802), John Stuart Mill 
(1848), Macleod (1855/56) and others (even though usually not formulated explicitly 
or precisely). But it failed to become the mainstream view, probably due to the 
fixation on legal tender or metallic money, and the subsequent focus on ‘M’-type 
deposit aggregates. Schumpeter (1954) points out that these authors recognized that in 
their economic effect money (traditionally measured) and bank credit could be 
identical:  
 
“As soon as we realize that there is no essential difference between those forms of ‘paper 
credit’ that are used for paying and lending, and that demand, supported by ‘credit’, acts 
upon prices in essentially the same manner as does demand supported by legal tender, we 
are on the way toward a serviceable theory of the credit structure…”.
22
 
 
                                                          21
 By far the largest role in creating broad money is played by the banking sector ... When banks make 
loans they create additional deposits for those that have borrowed.” (Bank of England, 2007). “Money-
creating organisations issue liabilities that are treated as media of exchange by others. The rest of the 
economy can be referred to as money holders (Bank of England, 2007). “... changes in the money stock 
primarily reflect developments in bank lending as new deposits are created” (Bank of England, 2007). 
“Given the near identity of deposits and bank lending, Money and Credit are often used almost inseparably, 
even interchangeably …” (Bank of England, 2008). “Each and every time a bank makes a loan, new bank 
credit is created – new deposits – brand new money” (Graham Towers, 1939, former Governor of the 
Central Bank of Canada). “Over time … Banknotes and commercial bank money became fully 
interchangeable payment media that customers could use according to their needs” (European Central 
Bank, 2000). “The actual process of money creation takes place primarily in banks” (Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago, 1961). “In the Eurosystem, money is primarily created through the extension of bank credit …. 
The commercial banks can create money themselves, the so-called giro money” (Bundesbank, 2009). 
22 Schumpeter (1954), p. 718f. 
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The recognition that credit may have the same economic effect as money was a 
major breakthrough, because legally money and credit are quite different constructs. 
As Schumpeter pointed out: 
 
“And this is why Thornton’s perception of the fact that the different means of payments 
may, on a certain level of abstraction, be treated as essentially alike was a major analytic 
performance, for the mere practitioner will in general be impressed by the technical 
differences rather than by the fundamental sameness.”
23
 
 
The link between credit and the macroeconomy was recognized widely enough at 
the beginning of the twentieth century to warrant the following entry in the 
Enzyclopedia Britannica (1911 edition): 
 
“The immense growth of credit and its embodiment in instruments that can be used as 
substitutes for money has led to the promulgation of a view respecting the value of money 
which may be called the Credit Theory. According to the upholders of this doctrine, the 
actual amount of metallic money has but a trifling effect on the range of prices, and 
therefore on the value of money. What is really important is the volume of credit instruments 
in circulation. It is on their amount that price movements depend. Gold has become only the 
small change of the wholesale markets, and its quantity is comparatively unimportant as 
determinant of prices” (italics added).
24
 
 
An explicit link between bank credit creation and macroeconomic activity was also 
made by Hahn (1920). But despite these early insights and occasional bursts of 
research focusing on credit, its role has remained too small in mainstream theories, 
especially in the post-war era. According to Schumpeter,  
 
“it proved extraordinarily difficult for economists to recognize that bank loans and bank 
investments do create deposits. In fact, throughout the period under survey they refused with 
practical unanimity to do so” (p. 1114). 
 
Thus this fact has not been properly reflected in macroeconomic or monetary 
models, and neither has it found its way into the quantity equation.25 Today, despite 
its simplicity, it is not generally well known, even among experts in economics and 
finance (as a questionnaire survey I conducted with students in Frankfurt in 2010 
demonstrated). This testifies to the possibility of regressive development of 
knowledge in economics and finance.  
 
However, the fact that banks create the money supply can be utilized to answer our 
research question at hand: In an economy with a banking system, the amount of 
money actually used for transactions can only increase when banks create new credit 
(Werner, 1992, 1997). This means that bank credit creation should have a direct 
impact on transaction volumes, demand, and hence also prices, as Mill (1848) and 
Bentham (1952-4) suggested.26 
                                                          
23 Schumpeter (1954), p. 719, emphasis as in original. 
24 Encyclopedia Britannica (1910-1911). 
25 until Werner (1992, 1997) that is. 
26 In Mill’s words, not dissimilar to the at the time unpublished Bentham: “This extension of 
credit by entries in a banker’s books, has all that superior efficiency in acting on prices, 
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In order to avoid confusion we should reflect these facts in our notation by 
replacing letter ‘M’ with ‘C’, for credit. Hence our equations become: 
 
(11) CV =   PQ   
 
(12)  CV =  CRVR +  CFVF 
 
(13)  PQ = PRQR  + PFQF 
 
(14) CRVR  = PRQR 
 
Since we defined PRQR as the value of all GDP-based transactions, we also know 
that the following equation holds, where PR stands for the GDP deflator and (PRY) 
stands for nominal GDP. 
 
(15)  CRVR  =  PRY 
 
  with VR =  (PRY)/CR = const. 
 
 
(16)  CFVF  =  PFQF 
 
  with VF =  (PFQF)/CF = const. 
 
 
For growth: 
 
(17) ∆(CRVR) = ∆(PRY) 
 
(18) ∆(CFVF ) = ∆(PFQF) 
 
3.3 Solving Key Puzzles 
Defining money 
Our simple model of disaggregated credit offers solutions to the puzzles and 
‘anomalies’ that we have identified. Firstly, we find that the problems of the 
traditional approach in measuring the money supply can be addressed by employing 
the more accurate definition of money as credit created by the banking system 
(including the central bank).
27
  
                                                                                                                                           
which we ascribed to an extension by means of bank notes…” p. 70. “Credit which is used to 
purchase commodities, affects prices in the same manner as money” (p. 71). 
27 Proponents of the deposit view sometimes argue that it should not matter whether deposits or loans are 
being analysed, as both tend to be equal in the long run. Werner (1996c) shows that in the Japanese case, 
a broad credit measure and M2+CD, the traditional deposit measure, diverged greatly in the 1990s. 
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(1) Credit creation measures only purchasing power that is actually used for 
transactions at the time of measurement – which is what the equation of exchange 
requires, and deposit aggregates cannot deliver. Credit always represents effective 
purchasing power, as borrowers take out loans to engage in transactions.  
 
(2) There is no doubt about where credit creation starts or stops – thus accurate and 
clear-cut measures of the effective ‘money supply’, namely credit creation, can be 
found. To be clear, only the net creation of new transferable purchasing power is part 
of the definition. Thus what is often termed ‘credit’, for instance, the issuance of 
corporate debt or government bonds, does not in itself constitute credit creation, as in 
these cases already existing purchasing power is transferred between parties. Trade 
credit, if not underwritten by financial institutions, is not transferrable (although it 
may still have economic effects, which require further research).  
 
(3) Importantly for our disaggregated quantity equation, credit creation can be 
disaggregated, as we can obtain and analyse information about who obtains loans and 
what use they are put to. Sectoral loan data provide us with information about the 
direction of purchasing power - something deposit aggregates cannot tell us. By 
institutional analysis and the use of such disaggregated credit data it can be 
determined, at least approximately, what share of purchasing power is primarily spent 
on ‘real’ transactions that are part of GDP and which part is primarily used for 
financial transactions. Further, transactions contributing to GDP can be divided into 
‘productive’ ones that have a lower risk, as they generate income streams to service 
them (they can thus be referred to as sustainable or productive), and those that do not 
increase productivity or the stock of goods and services. Data availability is 
dependant on central bank publication of such data. The identification of transactions 
that are part of GDP and those that are not is more straight-forward, simply following 
the NIA rules. 
 
Explaining the velocity decline 
The disaggregated model shows that the apparent velocity decline was due to the 
neglect of non-GDP transactions (financial transactions). A correct quantity equation, 
which is disaggregated at least into the two streams of GDP and non-GDP based 
transactions, should not suffer from a velocity decline. Empirical evidence for this has 
been offered in Werner (1997, 2005).28  
 
Explaining what makes banks special 
                                                                                                                                           
While significant growth of M2+CD seemed to suggest an economic recovery in 1995, the credit 
aggregate suggested a contraction of nominal GDP growth - for the first time since 1931. The latter is 
what happened. Conversely, while M2+CD growth remained stable from mid-1995, the credit aggregate 
suggested a sudden economic recovery from the fourth quarter of 1995, which again materialised. 
28 The very concept of velocity is also called into question by an empirical approach recognizing the 
reality of transaction settlement via the banking system. The original concept of velocity was based on 
the assumption of a gold standard and the idea that the number of times a quantity of gold circulates 
would increase the value of transactions that it can be used for. The mechanics are different in a modern, 
bank-based financial system where all non-cash transactions (close to 97% of all transaction values) are 
settled via the banking system. More on this elsewhere. 
 21
The approach places credit creation at its centre. The ability and license to create 
credit is the function of banks that sets them apart from other non-bank players in the 
economy. That banks ration and allocate credit is recognized in the literature. But this 
takes on a whole new dimension of importance when it is combined with the 
recognition that banks are the creators of the money supply. This is the missing link 
that causes credit rationing (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969, Jaffee and Russell, 1976; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) to have macroeconomic implications (Werner, 1992, 1997). 
Since the credit market is rationed and determines the money supply, the quantity and 
the quality of credit creation are key factors shaping the economy. This explains why 
non-bank sources of funding can never compensate in aggregate for a lack of bank 
credit: neither non-bank financial institutions, nor debt and equity markets can create 
credit. There are many policy implications of this fact, some of which will be 
explored in the second part of this paper. 
 
Explaining the ineffectiveness of interest rate reductions 
The puzzle of why over a decade of interest rate reductions failed to stimulate the 
Japanese economy is solved by equation (15). Nominal GDP growth is determined by 
credit creation used for GDP-based transactions. Interest rates do not appear in 
equation (15). Further, an inspection of the link between credit growth and interest 
rates shows that there is not a robust negative correlation between the two (Werner, 
2005). In other words, it is not surprising that lower interest rates are not able to 
stimulate the economy, if the key variable driving growth – credit for GDP-
transactions – is not growing. Likewise, raising interest rates should not slow the 
economy as long as credit creation for GDP transactions continues to grow. 
 
Explaining why we experience recurring banking crises 
Many empirical papers have found that banking crises follow a build-up of asset 
prices (e.g. Englund, 1999; Allen, 2001; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). There has however not been a convincing reflection of this relationship in 
macroeconomic models (partly because banks do not usually feature). Equation (16) 
fills the gap and offers the simplest possible argument: asset inflation is caused by the 
creation of credit (and hence new money) by banks for asset transactions. This boosts 
asset prices, but their continued rise is predicated on continued credit creation for 
asset transactions. As soon as this is not forthcoming sufficiently, asset prices must be 
expected to fall, which will render speculators out of pocket and asset loans non-
performing. Due to the modest capital cushion in banking, a mere 10% drop in the 
present value of the loan portfolio (e.g. due to non-performance) would tend to wipe 
out the majority of equity, rendering the banking system subject to either runs or 
avoidance in the inter-bank market – both of which leave banks unable to operate. 
 
The fact that asset prices are in aggregate determined by bank credit creation yields 
another important insight: the extension of credit for non-GDP transactions, if large 
and sustained enough, will produce a Ponzi scheme, whereby early entrants (those 
buying the assets that are driven up by bank credit creation) have a chance to exit with 
profits, while the late entrants (usually the broader public, buying at close to the peak 
of an asset bubble, as the media comes to focus on the phenomenal profits made by 
earlier entrants) will lose. The reason why credit for non-GDP transactions must be a 
Ponzi scheme is that only GDP transactions – as national income accountants know – 
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generate the value that can yield income streams to service and repay loans. Financial 
transactions rely on capital gains. Thus any gains made from selling assets that have 
risen constitute a zero-sum game, whereby they are merely transfers from the losers. 
Credit creation for non-GDP transactions is thus an inherently unsustainable zero-sum 
game, and if large enough results in major bankruptcies, banking crises and massive 
resource misallocation – just like any Ponzi scheme that is large enough. 
 
Given these dangers of credit for financial circulation, it is reasonable to 
contemplate how asset inflation and banking crises can be avoided – or consumer 
price inflation for that matter. It is commonly held among economists and the public 
that the process of money creation should be performed in a prudent manner. Since 
most commentators assume that this task is performed only by the central bank, bank 
credit growth and the decisions of banks as to who obtains the newly created money 
have often escaped attention. Once we recognize that banks are the creators of the 
bulk of the money supply (which many economists and finance academics may not 
yet do, although a growing number does), it stands to reason that some kind of 
responsibility goes with this privilege. Hence banks should monitor – ideally 
following specific rules – the quantity and quality of their credit creation. 
 
According to equation (16), asset inflation and boom/bust cycles – and hence 
systemic banking crises – can be avoided if banks do not extend credit for asset 
transactions. It also follows fairly quickly from equation (15) that credit of the type 
that increases productivity or the amount of goods and services available in the 
economy is less likely to produce consumer price inflation than credit creation in the 
form of consumer loans. We can thus usefully distinguish between productive, 
speculative and consumptive credit creation and its monitoring can serve to predict 
and prevent undesirable outcomes caused by credit creation. For details, see Werner 
(2005). 
 
Explaining the ineffectiveness of supply-side reforms 
In Japan more than two decades of significant structural reform, deregulation, 
liberalization and privatization, have failed to stimulate the economy. Likewise, the 
structural reforms implemented in transition economies, or Greece under its debt 
restructuring, have not stimulated demand. This may surprise proponents of supply-
side models (such as real business cycle or DSGE models). But it is easily explained 
in our framework, which includes a monetary sector that affects the real economy. 
According to equation (15), nominal GDP growth is restricted by credit creation for 
GDP transactions. Structural reforms may raise the potential growth rate, but if a lack 
of credit creation does not allow the demand side to expand, the economy will 
continue to grow below its potential. In this situation, the more the potential growth 
rate is raised through supply-side reforms, the greater the deflationary pressure would 
be. This seems to describe the situation in Japan well, as it is entering into the third 
decade of recession and deflationary pressures. It also throws a critical light on the 
recent argument by the World Bank (2012) that China requires structural reform to 
stimulate the economy and maintain high growth. 
 
Explaining the success of the German and East Asian economic model 
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Economies that manage to focus credit creation on productive and sustainable use 
– i.e. not for consumption and asset transactions – are likely to achieve superior 
economic performance (high nominal GDP growth and comparatively low inflation, 
without asset price cycles and with financial system stability). As the World Bank 
(1993) indicated, and others have also found (Patrick, 1962; Wade, 1990; Werner, 
2000a, b; Werner, 2003), at the heart of the East Asian economic miracle has been a 
process of guiding credit towards productive use and suppressing unproductive and 
unsustainable (hence systemically risky) use of credit.  
 
In East Asia this was done through the monetary policy tool of ‘window guidance’ 
(see Werner, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005). In the wake of the banking crisis, many 
governments have indeed reconsidered and embraced the idea that they need to 
intervene in banks’ credit allocation decisions (and the concept of direction of credit 
is now also discussed in the UK, for instance, by Lord Turner, 2011, in this issue).  
 
However, this tool was not employed in post-war Germany. Yet the economy 
avoided boom-bust cycles and asset bubbles and achieved relatively high, non-
inflationary growth. This raises the possibility that there is an alternative to the 
introduction of a system of ‘credit guidance’ by the central bank. It stands to reason 
that a similar result to direct intervention can be achieved by designing the structure 
of the banking sector such that a type of banks is dominant that generally takes little 
interest in lending for financial transactions. In Germany, banking is dominated by 
locally-headquartered, small banks that focus on lending to the household and 
productive SME sector (as opposed to financial speculators). There is much 
discussion about the lack of funding for SMEs in the UK. This should not surprise 
with a highly concentrated banking system where five banks account for over 90% of 
deposits. In Germany, about 70% of deposits are accounted for by over 1,000 locally-
headquartered, small savings and cooperative banks (Sparkassen and Volksbanken). 
 
3.4 Some Empirical Evidence 
The framework can account for the anomalies identified. In addition, there is a 
growing body of empirical evidence in its support. Examples will be reviewed briefly.  
 
Credit and growth 
Werner (1992, 1997, 2005, 2011b), using Japanese data, shows that credit for GDP 
transactions explains nominal GDP well over several decades, while alternative 
explanatory variables (including interest rates and money supply) are eliminated in a 
reduction from a general to the parsimonious specific model.  
 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the parsimonious empirical model of Japanese nominal 
GDP growth cited in Werner (1997, 2005):  
 
(19)  ∆GDPt =  0.509  +  0.411∆GDPt-1  + 0.283∆CRt  +  0.178∆CRt-3   +  t 
 (2.54) (3.99)     (3.45)  (1.83) 
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Table 1.  Parsimonious Model of Nominal GDP growth 
Modelling D4LnGDP by OLS; estimation sample 1984 (1) to 2001 (1) 
Coeff. Std.Err. t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
D4LnGDP_1  0.411 0.103 3.99 0.000 0.197 
Constant  0.509 0.200 2.54 0.013 0.090 
D4LCR  0.283 0.082 3.45 0.001 0.155 
D4LCR_3  0.178 0.098 1.83 0.072 0.049 
 
Sigma  1.043  RSS  70.654 
R^2  0.887  F(3,65) =  169.5 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood -98.724  DW  2.04 
no. of obs. 69  no. of param. 4 
mean(D4LnGDP)  3.410  var(D4LnGDP) 9.033 
 
AR 1-5 test: F(5,60) = 1.274 [0.287]   
ARCH 1-4 test: F(4,57) = 0.666 [0.618]   
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 4.029 [0.133]   
hetero test: F(6,58) = 1.082 [0.384]   
hetero-X test: F(9,55) = 0.933 [0.504]   
RESET test: F(1,64) = 0.020 [0.888]   
 
 
 
 25
Figure 1. Credit creation used for GDP transactions (CR) and nominal GDP growth 
in Japan. Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, and Bank of Japan 
 
King and Levine (1993) found in a 77 country study covering 3 decades that the 
importance of banks relative to the central bank, the percentage of credit allocated to 
private firms, and the ratio of credit issued to private firms to GDP are strongly and 
robustly correlated with growth, the rate of physical capital accumulation, and 
improvements in the efficiency of capital allocation. 
Calza (2006) found that there is a long-run relationship linking real loans to real 
GDP. While the authors argue that this should be interpreted as a long-run credit 
demand function, they concede that the inverse relationship, with credit supply 
driving GDP, cannot be excluded. The latter is postulated by equation (15). 
IMF (2008) found a statistically significant impact of credit growth on GDP 
growth in US data. 
Swiston (2008) using US data found that net tightening in commercial and 
industrial loan standards of 20 percentage points reduces GDP by ¾ percent over 1 
year and 1¼ percent over 2 years. Further, credit availability accounts for over 20 
percent of the typical contribution of financial factors to growth. 
Cappiello (2010) found in a multi-country panel study on the euro area that 
changes in the supply of credit, both in terms of volumes and in terms of credit 
standards applied on loans to enterprises, have significant effects on real economic 
activity. 
Lyonnet and Werner (this issue) found that UK credit for GDP transactions 
explains nominal GDP over several decades, beating monetary aggregates in a 
reduction from the general to the parsimonious form.  
 
Credit and asset prices 
Werner (1997, 2005) shows that credit for real estate transactions explains 
commercial real estate prices well. 
   Liang and Cao (2007) report that there exists unidirectional causality running 
from bank lending to property prices in China. 
Davis and Zhu (2011) on Hong Kong, and Goodhart and Hofmann (2003) on a 
panel of countries, find significant relationships between bank credit and property 
prices.  
These findings are in line with equation (16). 
 
Credit and banking crises 
Werner (1992, 1997, 2005) also emphasises that increased credit growth for non-
GDP (financial) transactions creates unsustainable asset price rises, followed by 
banking crises. Werner points out that the ratio of financial credit to total credit is a 
predictor of banking crises. As a more readily available approximation of whether too 
much credit for financial transactions is being created, total credit growth can be 
compared with nominal GDP growth (Werner, 1995c). By virtue of equations (15) 
and (16), faster total credit growth over time than nominal GDP growth can only 
come about by an increase in credit for financial circulation, and hence indicates a 
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build-up of unsustainable financial circulation credit. This method has recently also 
been adopted by the Economist (2011) for the same purpose.29  
Likewise, Jorda et al. (2011) applied this rule and found a close relationship 
between credit growth relative to GDP in the expansion phase and the severity of the 
following recession for 14 advanced countries over almost 140 years.  
Schularick and Taylor (2012), based on the same dataset, support the view that 
financial crises are “credit booms gone wrong”, whereby they also argue credit is the 
driving force and predictor of crises. 
Borio and Lowe (2002) found that financial instability increases when rapid credit 
growth and asset price rises are observed. This is in line with equation (16), as rapid 
credit growth in excess of GDP growth must be due to financial transactions, thus 
pushing up asset prices, while being unsustainable. 
Buyukkarabacak and Valev (2010) found that household credit expansions have 
been a statistically and economically significant predictor of banking crises. 
Enterprise credit expansions are weaker and less reliable in predicting banking crises. 
Enterprise credit expansion is likely to be a proxy for productive credit creation, 
which should not be associated with banking crises in our framework. 
 
Credit and the balance of payments 
Werner (1994) found that Japanese net long-term capital flows can be explained by 
credit creation for financial transactions (which is theoretically derived in Werner, 
2005). This explained the otherwise puzzling movement of capital flows. 
   Buyukkarabacak and Krause (2009) distinguish between household and corporate 
sector credit and investigated the effects these two types of credit have on the trade 
balance. They found that the composition of credit does matter for the trade balance: 
lending to consumers has a negative effect on net exports, while loans to firms 
contribute to a rise in net exports. This is again empirical evidence in support of our 
disaggregated credit model: productive corporate loans should deliver non-
inflationary growth, and as part of that also exports. Consumer loans only result in 
greater domestic demand, which at any given marginal propensity to import will have 
a negative impact on the trade balance. 
 
Credit and monetary policy 
Werner (1995c) argued that central banks should use the quantity of credit creation 
in order to achieve nominal GDP growth targets, referring to this policy as 
‘quantitative easing’. 
Werner (2002a) found that central bank use of credit controls and the direction of 
credit in East Asia goes back to an understanding of credit creation and the desire to 
allocate credit to productive uses. Furthermore, he argues that the development of 
bank-centered financing structures in many East Asian economies (as opposed to 
stock-market based structures in other countries) was the result of conscious 
                                                          
29 The Economist (2011) defines ‘excessive credit expansion’ as “the difference between the growth 
rate in bank credit and nominal GDP” (p. 69). “The fourth symptom of overheating, and one of the most 
important, is excessive credit expansion, which can lead to asset bubbles as well as inflation. The best 
measure of excess credit is the difference between the growth rate in bank credit and nominal GDP. It is 
normal for bank lending to grow a bit faster than GDP in an emerging economy as the financial sector 
develops, but credit is outpacing GDP by an alarming margin in Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong and Turkey. 
Lending to the private sector has increased by around 20% or more than nominal GDP over the past year in 
both Turkey and Hong Kong. …” p. 69 
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institutional design based on the goal to direct credit to productive use and thus 
maximise stable growth. 
Werner (2002b) found that Bank of Japan informal ‘guidance’ of credit (‘window 
guidance’) determined Japanese bank credit creation throughout the postwar era until 
including 1991. This shows that the experience of excessive bank credit expansion in 
the 1980s is not an indication of declining effectiveness of the direction of credit (but 
of the imposition of misguided loan growth targets encouraging speculative credit 
creation).  
Goodhart and Hofmann (2003) found that bank lending is in general rather 
unresponsive to interest rate movements. They also argue that this finding suggests 
that the usefulness of interest rate policy as an instrument to smooth boom-bust cycles 
in asset and credit markets is questionable. This supports equation (15), as interest 
rates do not feature in it. The finding is also in line with earlier puzzles concerning the 
relationship between interest rates and growth (see above). 
Chen and Werner (2011) found indirect evidence from monetary aggregates that 
Chinese ‘window guidance’ of credit is likely to remain the best indicator of the 
stance of monetary policy in China.  
 
Supply-determination of credit market 
   Jiménez et al. (2010), in a large sample of loan applications in Spain, managed to 
settle the question whether the credit market is demand- or supply determined: the 
empirical evidence suggests credit rationing and a supply-determined credit market. 
This supports the thesis that credit is always rationed, even during periods of 
economic expansion, as Werner (1997, 2005) has argued. 
Voutsinas and Werner (2011a) in a data set with 33,000 observations found that the 
supply of credit was an important constraint that influenced publicly-listed Japanese 
firms’ corporate capital structure decisions.  
 
In summary, our model of disaggregated credit seems consistent with the empirical 
evidence, which is meanwhile hard to reconcile with the standard approaches in 
finance or monetary economics. 
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4  Some Policy Implications  
4.1 How to prevent Banking Crises 
Equations (17) and (18) indicate that banking crises can be avoided if bank credit is 
mainly used for transactions that are part of GDP, ideally for investment purposes 
(‘productive credit creation’).30 More research is needed on the options available to 
regulators to achieve this. Werner (2005) has suggested to do this via regulation (the 
government or central bank imposing regulations on banks restricting credit creation 
for transactions that do not contribute to GDP). An alternative is via the design of the 
banking structure such that it is dominated by banks that tend not to engage in credit 
creation for non-GDP transactions – such as small, locally headquartered banks, 
including municipality-owned banks and credit unions, which account for about 70% 
of the banking market in Germany – as Werner (2011) argues. 
4.2 The Link between Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
What are the implications of the refined quantity equation, as presented above, for the 
role and impact of fiscal policy? Consider equation (17), rewritten with constant 
velocity: 
(17’)  ∆(PRY) = VR∆CR   
 
Any exogenous increase in a component of nominal GDP (such as nominal 
government expenditure g) cannot affect total nominal GDP, if credit creation for 
GDP transactions (∆CR) remains unaltered: assuming ∆CR = 0, and breaking down 
nominal GDP (PRY) into nominal consumption c, nominal government expenditure g, 
nominal investment i and nominal net exports nx, we obtain: 
 
(20)  ∆CR = 0 
 
(21)  ∆(PRY) = ∆c + ∆i + ∆g + ∆nx 
 
(22)  ∆g = – (∆c + ∆i + ∆nx) 
 
                                                          
30 As labeled such by Werner (2005), but also earlier authors, including less well-known ones, 
such as Alan Greenspan (1967): “When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable 
endeavors, the loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit continues to be generally available.” In contrast 
to financial credit: “The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy spilled over into the stock 
market -- triggering a fantastic speculative boom.” 
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Equation (22) indicates that the change in government expenditure ∆g is countered 
by a change in private sector expenditure of equal size and opposite sign, as long as 
credit creation remains unaltered. In this framework, just as proposed in classical 
economics and by the early quantity theory literature, fiscal policy cannot affect 
nominal GDP growth, if it is not linked to the monetary side of the economy: an 
increase in credit creation is necessary (and sufficient) for nominal growth. 
 
Notice that this conclusion is not dependent on the classical assumption of full 
employment. Instead of the employment constraint that was deployed by classical or 
monetarist economists, we observe that the economy can be held back by a lack of 
credit creation (see above). Fiscal policy can crowd out private demand even when 
there is less than full employment. Furthermore, our finding is in line with Fisher’s 
and Friedman’s argument that such crowding out does not occur via higher interest 
rates (which do not appear in our model). It is quantity crowding out due to a lack of 
money used for transactions (credit creation). Thus record fiscal stimulation in the 
Japan of the 1990s failed to trigger a significant or lasting recovery, while interest 
rates continued to decline.  
 
Put simply, for unchanged credit creation (which determines the size of the income 
pie), an increase in government expenditure amounts to an increase in the government 
share of the same income pie – and hence implies a reduction in the private sector 
share. As Milton Friedman put it:  
 
“The quantity theory implies that the effect of government deficits or surpluses 
depends critically on how they are financed. If a deficit is financed by borrowing 
from the public without an increase in the quantity of money, the direct expansionary 
effect of the excess of government spending over receipts will be offset to some extent, 
and possibly to a very great extent, by the indirect contractionary effect of the 
transfer of funds to the government through borrowing. … If a deficit is financed by 
printing money, there will be no offset, and the enlarged stock of money will continue 
to exert an effect after the deficit is terminated. What matters most is the behavior of 
the stock of money, and government deficits are expansionary primarily if they serve 
as the means of increasing the stock of money; other means of increasing the stock of 
money will have closely similar effects.”31  
 
Empirical Evidence from Japan 
In 1992, the Japanese government embarked on a series of fiscal stimulus packages, 
with the goal to boost domestic demand.32  On average, government spending 
contributed almost half of growth during the 1990s, while it only contributed a sixth 
of growth in the 1980s (Werner, 2005). 
In the general formulation of the model, with variable ∆CR we find, substituting 
(21) into equation (17’): 
                                                          
31 Milton Friedman (1977), in his entry under Money: Quantity Theory in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, p. 476. 
32 See the official statements at the announcement of stimulation packages. For instance: 
‘Keikyuu keizai taisaku (youshi), 16 November 1999, Economic Planning Agency (available 
at: www5.cao.go.jp/98/b/19981116b-taisakuyousi.html). 
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(23) ∆(c + i + nx)  =  V∆CR  –  ∆g 
 
whereby the coefficient for ∆g is expected to be close to –1. In other words, given 
the amount of credit creation produced by the banking system and the central bank, an 
autonomous increase in government expenditure g must result in an equal reduction in 
private demand. If the government issues bonds to fund fiscal expenditure, private 
sector investors (such as life insurance companies) that purchase the bonds must 
withdraw purchasing power elsewhere from the economy. The same applies (more 
visibly) to tax-financed government spending. With unchanged credit creation, every 
yen in additional government spending reduces private sector activity by one yen. 
 
Substituting the empirical formulation of nominal GDP, as shown in equation (19) 
into equation (21) and solving for non-government demand, we obtain: 
 
(24) ∆(ct+it+nxt) =    + ∆GDPt-1  +  0∆CRt +  3∆CRt-3  + ∆gt +  t 
 
The proposition of complete fiscal policy ineffectiveness can now be tested. In this 
case the regression would yield the following coefficient for government expenditure: 
  
(25)  =  – 1 
 
For accurate tests, seasonally differenced absolute changes of the variables must be 
used. Figure 2 shows the changes in government spending and private demand during 
the 1990s. Table 2 shows the regression results.  
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Figure 2.  Nominal private demand and government expenditure, absolute growth 
    Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 
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Table 2.  Estimation Results of Private Demand Model 
Modelling nGDP by OLS; sample 1983 (1) to 2001 (1) 
    Coeff Std.Err t-val t-prob Part.R^2 
Constant  440.29 244.6 1.80 0.076 0.046 
D4nGDP_1  0.476 0.098 4.85 0.000 0.257 
D4CR   0.085 0.031 2.75 0.008 0.100 
D4CR_3  0.059 0.036 1.64 0.105 0.038 
D4G   -0.974 0.140 -6.94 0.000 0.415 
 
Sigma  1231.87  RSS  103190221 
R^2  0.832  F(4,68) = 83.97 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood -620.482  DW  2.03 
no. of obs. 73  no. of param. 5 
mean(D4CINX)  2441.51  var(D4CINX) 8.39605e+006 
 
AR 1-5 test:  F(5,63) = 1.214 [0.313]   
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,60) = 0.605 [0.661]   
Normality test:  Chi^2(2)= 5.672 [0.059]   
hetero test:  F(8,59) = 1.990 [0.064]   
hetero-X test:  F(14,53) = 1.772 [0.068]   
RESET test:  F(1,67) = 0.199 [0.657]   
 
The coefficient for government expenditure () is –0.974. Rounding to one 
decimal digit, we obtain:

  = –1.0.  
 
 
 The empirical evidence is consistent with the contention that an economic 
recovery requires monetary expansion, here defined as credit creation.  
 
The finding suggests that Japanese fiscal policy has been ineffective during the 
1990s (but also the prior and subsequent decades, as tests show), because it was not 
supported by monetary policy. Ironically, this ineffectiveness finding may provide a 
strong case for using fiscal expenditure policy as an effective avenue for stimulating 
the economy, especially in times when bank credit is stagnating – fiscal policy, that is, 
which is appropriately coordinated with suitable monetary policy. The need for 
coordination of fiscal and monetary policy has been emphasised previously by 
economists such as Lerner (1943), Wray (2001), but also Schabert (2004).33  
                                                          
33 Wray (2001) frames his argument in terms of high-powered money, which however does not 
necessarily translate to greater effective spending: “… when demand is low, the private 
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Policy-makers that wish to stimulate growth can do so by increasing credit 
creation. There are a number of options available. One is via fiscal policy that is 
funded by credit creation or other measures that increase credit creation (as Werner, 
1995c, suggested in Japan, referring to this as ‘quantitative easing’ – an expression 
which was later borrowed by central banks to refer mainly to conventional monetarist 
bank reserve or high powered money expansion – for which many expressions 
already existed). As Blinder and Solow (1973:323) pointed out, there “is no 
controversy over government spending financed by printing money. … it will be 
expansionary”.  
 
The central bank could act to increase credit creation, and hence stimulate the 
economy, by raising its net open market purchase operations. Policies to stimulate 
bank credit creation could also have been adopted. Here, the central bank could utilize 
its unique status to solve the bad debt problem (by purchasing bad debts at face value, 
as suggested in Werner, 1996b). Given these findings, it appears central bank policy 
has not been as helpful as it could have been. The lack of incentives to coordinate 
monetary policy with the government’s fiscal policy may be one of the disadvantages 
of central bank independence.34  
 
A More Effective Way to Monetise Fiscal Policy 
There is a policy for governments to monetise fiscal policy even without 
cooperation from the central bank. The method, first suggested by Werner (1996c, 
1998a, 2000c) renders fiscal policy effective, according to the above model. The 
Ministry of Finance could cover the public sector borrowing requirement by 
substituting bond finance with borrowing from the private sector commercial banks. 
This would increase credit creation and stimulate the economy. 
Thus funding of fiscal expenditure by borrowing from banks would increase credit 
creation and hence the total amount of purchasing power in the economy. As a result, 
∆CR in equation (17’) above would rise, which would, in turn, boost nominal GDP. 
By shifting government funding away from bond finance and replacing it with 
borrowing from the commercial banks via simple loan contracts, credit creation will 
be stimulated.35 Unlike bond markets, banks create new purchasing power when they 
                                                                                                                                           
sector will not create money endogenously, hence, the government must expand the supply 
of HPM through fiscal policy.” 
34 Independence is not necessarily an obstacle, since a central bank can voluntarily cooperate 
to support the government’s policy. As Bernanke (2000) pointed out, “Cooperation with the 
fiscal authorities in pursuit of a common goal is not the same as subservience” (p. 163). 
Unfortunately, there are few examples of such cooperation by independent central banks. 
35 This is effectively the policy combination adopted by the Reichsbank from 1933 to 1937. Its 
President, Hjalmar Schacht, appeared to have been well aware of the quantity crowding out 
problem of unmonetised fiscal policy. In addition to stepping up the credit creation of the 
Reichsbank (by purchasing various forms of assets, including government bonds and bonds 
of other government institutions), Schacht instructed the establishment of government 
institutions that implemented fiscal spending programmes and were funded by the issuance 
of bills of exchange that were purchased by the banks and the central bank. Funding fiscal 
expenditure with money creation, as opposed to public bond auctions is called ‘silent 
funding’ (geraeuschlose Finanzierung) in the German tradition. 
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lend. This means that overall economic activity can be boosted (via fiscal policy), 
without any quantity crowding out that rendered fiscal policy ineffective during the 
1990s.36 
 
Figures 3 and 4 are used to illustrate the difference between stimulatory fiscal 
policy – here the example of a fiscal spending package – funded via bond issuance 
taken up by investors, such as life insurers, and stimulatory fiscal policy that is 
backed by credit creation.  
　
Ministry of Finance
(no credit creation)
Funding 
via
bond 
issuance
Fiscal 
stimulus
Net Effect = Zero
Non-bank private sector
　 (no credit creation）
　　　　
Fiscal stimulation funded by bond issuance
(e.g. : ¥20trn government spending package)
-¥20trn +¥20trn
 
Figure 3.  
                                                          
36 The Werner (1996c, 1998a, 2000c) proposal is supported and seconded by economists such 
as Congdon (2001), Smithers (2001) and the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf (2002), although 
they fail to cite it. 
 34
Non-bank private 
sector
(no credit creation)
+¥ 20 trn
Bank sector
(credit creation power)
Assets　　　　　　 Liabilities 
¥20 trn ¥20 trn
MoF
(No credit 
creation)
Funding 
via bank 
Loans
Fiscal 
stimulus
　deposit
Net Effect = ¥ 20 trn
Fiscal stimulation funded by bank 
borrowing
(e.g. : ¥20trn government spending package)
 
 
Figure 4. Bond-funded fiscal policy vs. bank-funded fiscal policy 
 
 
Although the central government funded parts of the 1998 budget from banks, this 
has remained negligible in size. With the majority of bond issuance taken up by the 
non-bank private sector (which does not have the power to create credit), fiscal 
spending had to crowd out private activity. 
 
Germany in 1968, under finance minister Karl Schiller, funded about 70% of the 
public sector borrowing requirement (amounting to DM13bn) through long-term 
borrowing from private banks. More recently, such as in 1999, Germany funded its 
public sector borrowing requirement (amounting to E35bn, approx. DM70bn), 
entirely through the issuance of government bonds, and, additionally, reduced its 
borrowing from financial institutions (by a net E10bn, approx. DM20bn).37 The 
model seems consistent with such evidence and the observation that fiscal policy in 
the late 1960s seemed more effective and fiscal multipliers were larger, than in the 
late 1990s or presently. It provides an explanation for this puzzle of declining fiscal 
multipliers.  
 
 
4.3 A proposal to solve the European sovereign debt crisis 
 
                                                          
37 I am grateful to Mr Wolfgang Eichmann, Head of Section III of the German Federal 
Statistical Office, for kindly writing to me, upon reading some of my work, and pointing out 
these supportive facts from Germany to me. See also Eichmann’s (2002) relevant article on 
the velocity of money, which, among others, cites Werner (1997). 
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A main drawback of the recent policies to tackle the European sovereign debt crisis 
has been that none addresses the central problem of falling growth in the periphery. 
What is required is a policy that not only shields the borrowing of the Eurozone 
governments from adverse market movements (such as rising yields due to 
speculative attacks or downgrades by rating agencies), but more importantly one that 
stimulates economic growth in the eurozone. 
 
Politicians and market participants have proposed that the ECB should purchase 
(more) European government bonds. This may be based on the understanding that the 
central bank is the principal creator of the money supply. However, central banks only 
create about 3% of the money supply in most economies. The vast majority is created 
and allocated by private-sector profit-oriented enterprises, the commercial banks. It is 
thus more logical to ask the banks to help fund government expenditure. Applying the 
Werner (1996c, 1998a, 2000c) proposal to the eurozone, we find that governments 
can stabilise their borrowing costs and stimulate domestic demand by a de-
securitisation of their funding operations: instead of issuing government bonds, a 
superior policy would be to borrow the public sector borrowing requirement from the 
commercial banks in their respective country (Siekmann and Werner, 2011). For 
instance, they can enter into 3-year loan contracts at the prime rate (which as of 
November 2011 was lower than the longer dated bond yields for all affected periphery 
countries). The prime rate is closer to the banks’ refinancing costs of 1%. 
 
The immediate savings would be substantial, as this method of enhanced debt 
management reduces the new borrowing costs. Instead of governments injecting 
money into banks, banks would give money to governments. This helps the banking 
sector, as its core business, to extend credit, is expanded, thus increasing retained 
earnings. These can then be used by banks to shore up their capital. There are 
substantial savings to the taxpayer as new bank rescues become largely unnecessary. 
Bank credit to the government will not be forced (as is forbidden in the EU treaties) 
but on a voluntary basis, at the prime rate. Eurozone governments remain zero risk 
borrowers according to the Basel capital adequacy framework (banks are thus happy 
to lend).  
 
Finally, this proposal addresses the core underlying problem: slowing growth and 
the need to stimulate it. From the credit model we know that the proposal will boost 
nominal GDP growth – and avoid crowding out from the bond markets. This is 
especially a problem as fiscal policy has tightened in the eurozone, and monetary 
policy is de facto also tight: bank credit is slowing down sharply, and recently has 
turned to contraction in many eurozone countries, including Germany and the 
periphery. Bank credit extension is credit creation, adding to the money supply. From 
the credit model we know that the proposal will boost nominal GDP growth – and 
avoid crowding out from the bond markets. This increases employment and tax 
revenues. It can push countries back from the brink of a deflationary and 
contractionary downward spiral into an upward cycle of growth, greater tax revenues 
and falling debt/GDP. 
  
Would banks be willing to lend to governments? 
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Banks have become risk-averse and are only willing to lend to the lowest risk 
borrowers. This is the government, able to command in theory even lower rates than 
the private sector prime rate. The Basel capital adequacy framework reflects this 
reality. This is also true for periphery countries: banks’ solvency is ultimately 
guaranteed by governments, not the other way round. Thus lending to their 
governments, when undertaken as part of this proposal, will not hurt the banks. To the 
contrary, it will improve banks’s P&L and balance sheets, as well as the fiscal 
situation of the governments concerned, directly and indirectly, as economic growth 
will be boosted. 
 
The European Central Bank’s Long-Term Refinance Operation (LTRO), 
announced on 8 December 2011, offered banks unlimited funding at a fixed interest 
rate of 1%, while formalizing that all bank lending is eligible as collateral for central 
bank funding. By February 2012, over 1 trn Euro in LTRO funding were borrowed by 
banks. However, much of this money is put into deposit with the ECB system. This 
policy on its own is thus not likely to be sufficient to accelerate bank credit creation. 
One problem is that banks are required to mark to market any securities holdings, thus 
limiting the appeal of investing in periphery government bonds. What is needed is an 
increase in the supply of bank credit through loan contracts, which do not have to be 
marked to market. 
 
After the ECB has replaced the market-based funding of banks via the interbank 
market with its direct lending programme, governments need to match this policy by 
replacing the market-based government funding via the bond market with a direct 
government borrowing programme via loan contracts from the commercial banks. 
This policy would boost domestic demand in the countries that adopt it, as bank credit 
creation would accelerate, in line with equation (17). 
 
Ideally, such a policy is part and parcel of a new approach to monetary and fiscal 
policy which I believe would end the so-called European crisis quickly and at 
minimal cost, without threatening either exit or further centralization of decision-
making powers. The key policies I would suggest the ECB to adopt are: 
1. The ECB should purchase all non-performing assets from all Eurozone banks at 
face value, in exchange for banks agreeing to comply with a new ‘credit guidance 
regime’ run by the ECB. 
2. The ECB should introduce and operate this new ‘credit guidance’, whereby the 
ECB via its NCBs requires banks to meet monthly and quarterly quotas concerning 
the growth of total credit outstanding AND the credit outstanding in each of the sub-
categories of credit, on which banks have to report on a monthly basis as well, 
namely:  
A. bank credit for GDP transactions, divided into mortgage credit for newbuilds to 
households, consumer credit, credit to the manufacturing industry (divided into 
further specific industries, though no sub-targets set), credit to the construction sector, 
credit to the non-financial service sector (divided further into specific industries), 
R&D, education, other categories 
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B. bank credit for non-GDP transactions, divided into credit to other banks, credit to 
non-bank financial institutions, credit to financial or property holding companies, 
mortgages or loans to purchase existing assets, other categories 
 
whereby the ECB via its NCBs restricts credit to type B sectors and sets positive 
YoY% growth targets for credit of type A. 
 
3. The ECB should institute a loan guarantee scheme for the most desirable types 
of loans loans, i.e. to the manufacturing sector implementing new technology, 
environmentally enhancing and sustainable energy producing sector, as well as in 
R&D and education. Loans are guaranteed by the ECB. 
 
4. The ECB should immediately re-introduce the Bundesbank’s bill rediscounting 
operations, expanded to all NCBs and extended to firms in type A sectors, but 
Eurozone-wide, via the NCBs. 
 
5. Until above scheme has got traction, the ECB, via its NCBs introduces a new 
direct lending facility whereby the NCBs extend credit to type A sector borrowers. 
 
6. The ECB should introduce a new scheme, whereby the ECB and NCBs meet 
with the national finance/treasury ministries and debt management offices in order to 
end the issuance of government bonds in the markets and instead fund all public 
sector borrowing requirements (that must meet unchanged Brussels budgetary 
requirements) through direct loan contracts from the national banks. This reduces 
borrowing costs sharply, as the prime rate is lower, helps banks as their business 
expands without further capital adequacy requirements (risk weights are zero), while 
the loans do not need to be marked to market, but can be used for ECB refinancing. 
(The Werner-Siekmann proposal). 
 
7. The ECB should meet with national bank regulators, the European Banking 
Authority and the BCBS in order to negotiate release of eurozone banks from the 
Basel capital adequacy standards for the coming three years, until bank credit growth 
and hence nominal GDP growth is back to full employment levels. 
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